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Human rights and collective goods: 
a non-individualistic approach 
                                                                                     ΜARIA - ARTEMIS KOLLINIATI
This article proposes1 that Razian account of rights has to be read as “double 
dimension rights”, instead of an interest theory of rights. In such a new reading of 
Raz´s account of rights, two attributes of Razian rights are highlighted: the “why-
dimension” and the “how-dimension.” In particular, the “why-dimension” gives due 
consideration to the relationship between rights and collective goods; it indicates 
that rights are adopted, first, in order to preserve a certain moral, public or political 
culture2, and, second, in order to protect inherent public or collective goods3, which 
serve the communal peace. 
In Razian thinking the initial idea of rights is not just to set limits in the name of 
“communal peace” or aiming to protect an individual and their personal autonomy 
from the demands of “collective goals”. Razian rights relate to autonomy and the 
protection of the well-being of the right-holder4 but are not restricted to it. He 
supports the view that most if not all rights are not side-constraints5. The main idea 
of rights is not just to protect individuals, as if they were isolated from the political 
community. Much more than this, rights enable people to live together harmoniously 
by preserving collective goods6. The well-being of the community is also a matter of 
rights, and in these terms Raz’s approach escapes individualism.
The second attribute of the double dimension, namely the “how-dimension” of 
rights indicates the practical significance of rights. From this perspective, rights can 
be seen as a checks and balances mechanism, or a weapon against state sovereignty. 
Moreover, one of the main functions of how-dimension rights is their dynamic 
character, which implies that from old rights, inevitably, new duties can be created. 
This article focuses mainly on the “why-dimension” and in particular on the notion 
“collective goods”.  
Beyond an interest theory of rights
The “double dimension rights” introduced in this article is particularly important 
for, although Raz’s approach to rights has been categorised as an “interest theory”, his 
account is not concerned mainly with interests. In particular, the tradition of analytical 
legal theory distinguishes between the “will theory” (or “choice theory”) of rights and 
the “interest theory” (or “benefit theory”). Both focus on the relationship between 
rights and duties7. Razian account of rights has been categorized as foundational to 
interest theory8, in moral philosophy9 or political philosophy10. The interest theory 
of Razian rights relates to the idea that when an interest is sufficient reason to hold 
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another to be subject to a duty, a law may create a right11.
Despite the fact that in Raz´s approach the relationship between interests, duties 
and rights is central, Razian rights should not be conceived as being concerned mainly 
with interests. At the core of the Razian account of rights, collective goods are found, 
whereas interests have merely an instrumental value for rights.  As opposed to this, 
Scanlon, among other scholars, supports the view that the justification of Raz´s rights 
relates to individual interests. In Scanlon´s perspective in spite the fact that the aim 
of Razian rights is to serve and preserve collective goods, this in practice implies that 
the justification of rights relates to individual interests in preserving certain collective 
goods. From this point of view, rights are justified on the basis of individual interests 
to serve collective goods that guide society to operate in a certain way12. It seems that, 
for Scanlon, Razian rights cannot escape individualism. 
However, Raz rejects individualistic approaches. For example, one of the reasons 
why he criticises the traditional approaches of rights is because, from Raz´s perspective, 
traditional theories of rights adopt an individualistic perspective of rights, to the 
extent that they focus on the benefits of rights upon a person’s private life and not 
upon the social aspects of life. Individualistic approaches to human rights have been 
criticized from Raz, mentioning that: “the rights tend to be individualistic in being 
rights to what each person can enjoy on his or her own: such as freedom from coercive 
interference by others, rather than to aspects of life which are essentially social, such 
as being a member of a cultural group”13.
If, as Scanlon claims, Razian rights were justified on the basis that individuals have 
an interest in the maintenance of public goods, this would imply that the interests of 
individuals are more important than the public goods themselves. Nevertheless, for 
Raz, collective goods have intrinsic value; rights are justified on the basis that they 
preserve intrinsically valuable collective goods, rather than on the basis of individuals’ 
interests. However, at this point a clarification should be made. Interests are not 
totally marginalised in Razian thinking, despite the fact that collective goods are 
intrinsically valuable and in a sense are fundamental to Raz´s rights. Razian rights 
cannot be described as teleological in the sense that Will Kymlicka (2002) uses the 
term; the protection of collective goods is not totally detached from the interests of 
individuals. In the Razian approach, as opposed to teleological approaches, people 
cannot be sacrificed in the name of collective goods14.
Teleological theories presuppose a tension between individuals´ interests and the 
preservation of goods such as freedom, whereas in Razian thinking, there is no a priori 
competitive relationship among rights, individual interests, and collective goods. On 
the contrary, they do have a mutual relationship. Sacrificing an individual for the 
sake of a collective good would contradict the main idea of Razian rights, to the 
extent that people’s interests shape the character of a society, and such a society has 
been shaped from interests, “making” collective goods, which are preserved through 
rights. Additionally, interests not only shape the character of the society but are one 
of the conditions for someone’s becoming a right-holder; right-holders are described 
as “creators who have interests”15. Nevertheless, “the interest of individuals does not 
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translate itself into principles of rights”16.
The character of the society that consists of several collective goods is the main 
factor in securing rights. For example, individuals´ interests to live in an ideal society 
(e.g. economically prosperous society) do not imply that individuals have the right 
to do so. Moreover, being a human being does not automatically imply individual 
rights. Accordingly, individual interests are not protected automatically from 
societies. The character of societies may be shaped by individuals’ interests, and then 
rights protect that character, but rights are not identical to individual interests. If 
rights are adopted, then duties will also be developed17. Rights are secured principally 
in order to protect collective goods, the society’s political culture and individual well-
being, not interests18; “without the public good the right would not have had the 
significance it did have”19. However, there is a “dual harmony” between common 
goods and interests for rights benefit both the right-holders and the collective goods20.
The notion of collective goods  
The terms “common good”, “general good”, “public good”, “inherent public 
good” and “collective good” are used interchangeably by Raz. In this article I use 
mainly the terms “common good” and “collective good” unless I am quoting Raz 
himself. First and foremost, the Razian common good should not be confused with 
the public interest. Razian common good on the one hand, and on the other hand 
the public interest or the economic notion of the public good, are not connected21. 
The main difference between these two notions is the fact that the common good is 
in everybody’s interest in a given society, whereas the public interest might only be 
in the interest of some members of the society. In the same vain, the public good (or 
public interest) might benefit some individuals and at the same time negatively affect 
others (e.g. railways). Therefore, a balance must be struck among conflicting interests 
for the sake of the public interest22.
For Raz, something is a public good only if the potential beneficiaries control its 
distribution and benefits. Public goods are divided into two categories: contingent 
public goods (e.g. water supply, clean air, etc) and inherent public goods (e.g. a tolerant 
or democratic society), which are also called collective goods23. Collective goods can 
be “general beneficial features” which prevail in a given society and direct societies24. 
In Razian account, collective goods have an intrinsic25, not an instrumental, value26. 
On the contrary, for Raz liberal rights have an instrumental, not an intrinsic, value 
for they aim to serve a collective good which does have intrinsic value.   
Razian collective goods possess inherent value27. As opposed to this, collective 
goods articulated from economists28 have an instrumental value to the extents that 
possess value because they enable individuals to advance various interests. In Raz´s 
thought collective goods are inherently valuable because they are constitutive of 
the possibility to enable intrinsically valuable objectives. Social forms constitute an 
example of collective goods that might enable autonomously pursuing modes of life 
which are intrinsically valuable themselves29. For Raz, in a given society a good is 
a public good when each potential beneficiary controls its distribution and takes 
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their share of its benefits30. Furthermore, public goods are divided into contingent 
public goods and inherent public goods from Raz. The distribution of contingent 
public goods cannot be controlled by the potential beneficiaries (e.g. water supply 
controlled by a state or a company, clean air) and their value is instrumental31.
Inherent public goods or collective goods are attributes of societies that benefit the 
members of those societies. For example, an inherent public or collective good might 
be a society that is tolerant, educated or respects human beings. Inherent public 
goods have two principal features; the first one can be called non-exclusivity and the 
second one concerns their intrinsic value. The first characteristic implies that the 
members of the society cannot be excluded from enjoying them. The non-exclusivity 
of collective goods has two interrelated dimensions: all members of given societies 
benefit from and are constrained by collective goods. The preservation of a collective 
good does not serve just the interests of particular individuals or group of people, 
but it does serve the interests of the whole population32. The notion of “the common 
good” contains the idea of non-exclusivity, as it refers to goods that serve interests in 
a non-exclusive and non-excludable way. 
As far as the second feature of inherent public goods, this concerns the idea that 
some collective goods are intrinsically valuable33. Intrinsically valuable things are either 
valuable in themselves or they are constituent goods which they contribute to the 
enrichment of something which is intrinsically good. For example life is intrinsically 
valuable, and so are some things that can enrich it34. Accordingly, intrinsically 
valuablecollective goods or inherent public goods are not instrumentally good for 
they are valuable independently of their consequences35; they are desirable for their 
own sake and not because they will enable someone to do something36. Intrinsically 
valuable collective goods do not have a particular project or objective that has to be 
achieved at a certain point of time37. The relationship between intrinsically valuable 
collective goods and human beings can be seen as a “participation-in-a-value” 
relationship, or a “commitment” whose purpose is not the attainment of a particular 
goal. From this perspective, only when the participants abandon the “commitment”, 
the “participation-in-a-value” relationship can be finished38, not when they reach a 
destination.   
Finnis’s and Raz´s collective goods
Razhas adopted Finnis’s notion of the general or common good39. Therefore, I 
sketch out Finnis’s account of the common good and its relationship with Razian 
approach of collective goods. Despite the fact that Razian collective good has been 
inspired from Finnis´s common good, Finnis’s and Raz’s notions of common good 
have some differences, given that they offer different accounts of practical reasoning. 
Moreover, the two scholars conceive differently the relationship between rights and 
common goods. For Raz, human rights are secured in order to serve common goods, 
whereas for Finnis, human rights are not subject to the common good; “aspects of 
the common good” are able to limit human rights. In contrast, it would be self-
contradictory for Raz to claim that in the name of common goods, it is possible to 
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limit human rights. For Raz the core idea of human rights is to preserve common 
goods, whereas in Finnis’s thinking, human rights are preserved from the common 
good40.
Both scholars´ accounts of common goods is not utilitarian. Razian collective 
good is not related to utilitarianism or to calculating consequentialist goals, for it does 
not concern the sum of the good of individuals and does not reflect an aggregation 
of self-interests. Raz develops the idea that collective goods of a community refer to 
goods that serve people’s interests in a conflict-free, non-exclusive and non-excludable 
way41. Similarly, “the common good”, as defined by Finnis, does not aim to “the 
greatest good for the greatest number” and is not related to utilitarianism42.
For Finnis, common good is related to justice, to the extent that what is necessary 
for the common good of a community can be described from a theory of justice43. His 
account of justice44 is not limited to “the basic institutions of society” or, like Rawlsian 
theory, to the ideal conditions of a society45. Finnis´s justice contains the notion 
of “subsidiarity”, which means “assistance” or “help” and is seen as precondition 
of the proper functioning of an association46. In these terms, what is necessary for 
the prosperity and the well-being of members of the community is the effective 
collaboration of persons and the co-ordination of resources and enterprises. For 
Finnis common good is called this set of conditions of collaboration and enhances 
the well-being of all members of the community47.
“The common good” of a political community has been devided by Finnis into 
three senses and can refer to values, concrete operational objectives or conditions. 
The first sense concerns its evaluative dimension and relates to the idea that some 
values are “common goods” because, according to practical reasoning, they are good 
for everyone48. The second sense of “the common good” concerns its quality. Every 
value that is good in the practical reasoning, is a “common good” for it can be enjoyed 
by a limitless number of people (i.e. it is non-exclusive), in a limitless number of ways 
and a limitless number of times (i.e. it is non-excludable). In these terms, it could be 
claimed that this sense relates to Razian notion of “intrinsically valuable collective 
goods” and to what Raz calls the “non-exclusive and non-excludable” character of 
“the common good”, which were described above. In the third sense, “the common 
good” is conceived as a set of conditions that contribute to the reasonable objectives 
and values of people. “The common good” in the third sense enables members of the 
community to realise for themselves the values that give them reason to collaborate 
with others in the political community; it refers to values, operational objectives and 
conditions49.
Although some types of political arrangements and laws are excluded from the 
“common good,” this does not mean that “the common good” concerns specific 
goals that have to be achieved by either the community or its members. Each 
member of the political community is free to choose and pursue their own objectives. 
“The common good” in the third sense does not indicate which values and aims 
the members of the community should share50. It does imply that in order for each 
member of the community to achieve their objectives, a “set of conditions” or a “set 
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of sets of conditions” should be secured. There are several different reasonable ways of 
life that can be pursued by individuals, not only one that should be promoted by the 
community51. The existence of such a “set of conditions” or “set of sets of conditions” 
is possible because people have a “common good” in the first sense52. This means 
that a “set of conditions” is possible because there are some “goods” that are good 
for each and every person in the practical reason, not because all human beings share 
the same objectives and values. These “goods” are called “common goods.” In these 
terms, each member of a political community can set their own goals, but a “set of 
conditions” should exist within the community that enables its members to attain 
their goals53.
It could be claimed that “the common good” in the first sense (i.e. some values 
are “common goods” for, in practical reasoning they are good for everyone), relates 
to “values which we do not exhaust”54, that implies that such values do not have a 
specific objective to attain. These values are “good” in practical reasoning, and so 
constitute a “common good.” The common good relates to a “commitment” or a 
“participation-in-a-value” relationship; people “participate” in these values without 
reaching a destination, for there is no particular destination to reach55. For Finnis, 
seven such values constitute the basic forms of human good, and each of them is 
a“common good” in the second sense as long as they fulfill the non-exclusive and 
non-excludable conditions56.  In particular, the seven values are: life, knowledge, play, 
aesthetic experience, friendship (sociability), (freedom in) practical reasonableness 
and religion57. However, the fact that there are many different types of friendship, 
knowledge, religion and lifestyle that could be characterized as a “common goods,” 
this does not imply that “anything goes.” For example, not every relationship can be 
characterized as friendship and, therefore, as a “common good”. For a value to be 
classified as a common good, it should be good for everyone, in practical reasoning58.
Approaching practical reason
If Finnis’s seven basic human values are good according to practical reason, what 
is practical reason and how does it function? Although Raz adopts Finnis’s notion of 
“common good,” the two scholars have different definitions of “practical reason.” For 
Finnis, human values and practical principles which are intrinsic values extend beyond 
time and individual communities. They contain a self-evident good and are grasped 
by human beings’ practical reason. In Finnis´s thought, practical reason grasps human 
goods that are intrinsically valuable; afterwards, practical reasonableness becomes one 
of the seven human goods that are identified by practical reason59. These goods are 
neither products of society nor the creation of human beings. Although Finnis and 
Raz agree that “a proper understanding of practical reasoning will lead to a proper 
understanding of morality,” they develop different conceptions of practical reason60.
Unlike Finnis, Raz supports the view that practical reason and goods are bound to 
social forms. For Raz, practical reason is not associated with a specific good or goods; 
On the contrary, Finnis claims that practical reason relates to particular goods. For 
Raz, goods – including Finnis’s seven basic goods – exist only within society. In Razian 
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thinking61, practical reason is able to grasp only values that are already constituted 
or implied by existing social forms. For example, life is a precondition of the good; 
though life is intrinsically valuable, it is not an intrinsic good. If someone accepts 
that life is an intrinsic good a priori before society, this might imply that particular 
social and personal conditions are not necessary to grasp it62. The good itself and the 
concept of the good are made available through culture63. Given that for Raz practical 
reason does not grasp any kind of timeless values and goods that are independent of 
society, liberal perfectionism is needed in order to promote institutions “that create 
the social forms necessary for morality”64.
All in all, in Razian thinking the idea of the creation of values is found, where 
as Finnis supports the view of the realization of values. For Finnis, practical reason 
grasps goods which already exist prior society and can be realized by all human 
societies, whereas for Raz, goods have been shaped by existing social forms and 
practical reason is able to modify them. Both Finnis and Raz agree that the role of 
the law is not restricted to sanctioning and is not just instrumental. More than this, 
law has a positive role which is to enable social co-ordination that makes a variety of 
goods possible. The legal positivist Raz and the natural theorist Finnis share the view 
that morality is a cognitivist conception, but they disagree about its definition. Their 
conception of morality is based on an idea of practical reason that makes possible 
social co-ordination. Finally, they both share the view that individuals co-ordinate 
their activities and use the law to secure their common good(s).
Conclusion 
To conclude, approaches that categorise Raz’s account of rights as an interest 
theory are incomplete because they are unable to sketch out two crucial aspects of 
Raz´s rights. The first is the relationship between rights and collective goods. Interest 
theories focus on interests and duties, so they overshadow collective goods. However, 
the relationship between rights and collective goods is a core element of Razian 
rights. This relationship cannot be downplayed because it is Raz’s most important 
contribution to human rights theory. In these terms, one of the reasons why Raz´s 
account of rights have been read from the author as double-dimension rights, 
rather than as an interest theory of rights, is that in Razian thinking interests are 
merely instrumentally valuable. On the contrary, collective goods have an intrinsic 
value. Rights have interests at their core, because the direct objects of rights (i.e. 
the character of the society and collective goods) are partly shaped by interests. 
Nevertheless, rights are not restricted to individual interests. The justifications for 
rights are several, whereas only one of which is individual interests65. The validity of 
rights is not confined solely to interests; an interest is merely one element of a larger 
whole66.
The second issue that “double dimension of rights” illustrates, and not an 
interesting theory, is the dynamic character of rights, which concerns the “how-
dimension” of rights. Several interest theories underestimate the additional duties 
that could arise from future changes in the society. Raz, on the contrary, takes the 
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future changes in circumstances seriously, and highlights the capacity of old rights to 
generate new duties.
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